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CURRENT DECISIONS
passing of our federal system,19 yet for others it represents another
step implementing the true intent of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 °
Alan MacDonald
Torts-DOCTRINE OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE-DAMAGES RECOVERABLE
BY TRESPASSING CHILD IN ABSENCE OF E NTICEMENr OR ALLUREMENT.-
On April 8, 1964 the Supreme Court of Alaska' reversed a superior court
decision and held that the element of enticement or allurement need not
exist before there can be liability to a child trespasser under the Doctrine
of Attractive Nuisance. 2
Five-year-old Gerald Vaska boarded the defendant's barge by way
of a plank which extended to shore and was killed on deck when a heavy
wooden cargo pallet fell on him. His administrator brought suit to
recover damages for the death of the child. The case was tried by the
Superior Court of the Fourth Judicial District and at the end of the
plaintiff's case, the defendant moved for dismissal. The motion was
granted on the ground that under the evidence and the law, the child's
death was not a result of any negligence on the part of the defendant.
The court further stated that the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine would
not be applicable in this case because there was nothing about the
barge and the cargo pallet that was particularly attractive or inherently
dangerous to young children.
The Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance, as originally formulated, was
in a state of confusion. The Supreme Court of the United States, in a
much criticized opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes,3 held that an occupier
or possessor of land was liable for conditions which were highly
dangerous to a trespassing child, only where there was something about
the land or some object on it that enticed or allured the child into ex-
posing himself to the dangerous condition.4
19. Supra, note 2, a dissent by Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Clark.
20. Adamson v. California, 332 US. 46, 68 (1946).
1. Taylor v. Alaska Rivers Nay. Corp., 391 P.2d 15 (Alaska 1964).
2. The Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance was developed by courts making the oc-
cupier or possessor of land liable for conditions which are highly dangerous to tres-
passing children. It was considered that because of a child's immaturity and lack of
judgment, he was incapable of understanding and appreciating all of the possible
dangers which he may encounter in trespassing.
3. United Zinc and Chemical Co. v. Butt, 258 U.S. 268, 275 (1921). "A child
was not allowed to recover when he was not induced to trespass by the presence
of a pool of poisoned water that killed him, but discovered it after he had come upon
the land."
4. Keefe v. Milwaukee and St. Paul R.R., 21 Minn., 207, 18 Am. Rep. 393 (1875);
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Years later, however, this decision was overruled by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Best v. District of Columbia.5 The great
majority of courts now agree with the Best case, that the element of
enticement or allurement need not exist before there can be liabiilty.
The element is significant only in so far as it bears upon the likelihood
that a child would place himself in a position where injury would be
likely to occur.6
The Supreme Court of Alaska adopted the latter view and the rule
formulated in 1934 in section 339 of the Restatement of Torts7 with the
revisions recommended by Dean Prosser which states certain require-
ments for the application of the Attractive Nuisance Principle.' Apply-
ing these rules to the evidence presented by the plaintiff, the court stated
that a prima facie case of liability was shown and that the trial judge
erred in dismissing the action before he had heard both sides of the
case.
9
Vhile some jurisdictions still adhere to the old rule,10 the great
majority of the courts now agree that enticement or allurement is
Daniels v. New York and N.E.R. Co., 154 Mass. 349, 28 N.E. 283 (1891); PRossERa ToRTS
§ 76 (1955).
5. Best v. District of Columbia, 291 U.S. 411, 419 (1934) "The visible attraction need
not be the immediate cause of the injury'"
6. Verriclia v. Society Dis M. and S. Del Lazio, 366 pa. 629, 79 A.2d 237 (1951);
Moore v. North Chicago Refiners and Smelters, 346 Il. App. 530, 105 N.E.2d 553 (1952);
Lone Star Gas Co. v. Parsons, 159 OkI. 52, 14 P.2d 369 (1932); Banker v. McLaughlin
146 Tex. 434, 208 S.W.2d 843 (1948).
7. REsrATEMENT, TORTS § 339 (1934). "A possessor of land or chattel is subject to
liability for physical harm to children trespassing thereon, caused by a condition of
the land or chattel if:
"(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or
has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and
"(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know, and
which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or
serious bodily harm to such children, and
"(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the conditions or realize the
risk involved in intermedalling in it or coming within the area made dangerous by it,
and
"(d) the ability of maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger
are slight as compared with the risk to children involved, and
"(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise
to protect the children."
8. Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CAL. L. REv. 427 (1959).
9. Trusty v. Jones, 369 P.2d 420 (Alaska 1962); Pogge v. Weaver, 368 P.2d 810 (Alaska
1962).
10. States which follow the old rule are: Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, South Carolina, Tennessee. PROSSER AND SMnH, TORTS 491 (3rd Ed. 1962).
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not essential in finding liability." It appears that the reasoning behind
the majority is to curtail to the same reasonable extent the defendant's
privilege to act as he sees fit without care for the protection of others. 2
Gus James iI
Torts-DAMAGES-NEGLIGENT INJURY TO HUSBAND DOES NOT GIVE
WIFE ACTION FOR Loss OF CoNsoRTIuM.-In Rush v. Great American
ins. Co.' the plaintiff sued to recover damages for loss of consortim
resulting from injuries negligently inflicted upon her husband by the
defendant. The defendant demurred, alleging that no such action
could be maintained by the wife under common law and that there
was no state statute permitting such an action. The trial court sustained
the demurrer and dismissed the case. Affirming, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee ruled that the common law was, and continues to be, in full
force and effect,2 except, of course, where expressly changed by
statute.3 In its strict adherence to a common law rule which was
originally based upon the inequality of the sexe, this decision stands in
direct opposition to modern social pressures which demand complete
legal equality for the married woman. It is obviously of great im-
portance to understand why, in the face of desirable reform, this court
has decided to support that ancient common law principle.
Although there is no universally accepted definition of the word
"consortium,"' 4 it generally refers to "conjugal fellowship; and the
term embraces love, companionship, affection, society, comfort, sexual
11. With the exception of Virginia, West Virginia, PROSSER AND SMITH, TORTS 492
(3rd Ed. 1962) and New York, Weisbein, The Attractive Nuisance Doctrine and Its
Status in New York, 8 N.Y.U. INTRAMURAL L. REv. 224 T1953), who purport to reject
the whole theory of attractive nuisance and find liability under certain exceptions,
the remaining states follow the Best case, supra, note 5, and the RESTATEMENT, ToPrS,
S 339 (1934) and hold that enticement and allurement are not necessary before liability.
12. Wilson, Limitations on the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine, 1 N.CJL. Rnv. 162
(1923); James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land, 63 YALE L.J. 144 (1953).
1. 376 S.W.2d 454 (Tenn. 1964).
2. Accord, Cogburn v. State, 198 Tenn. 431, 281 S.W.2d 38 (1955).
3. TENN. CoNsT. ART. XI, § 1; accord, Henley v. State, 98 Tenn. 665, 41 S.W. 352,
39 L.R.A. 126 (1897).
4. E.g., Igneri v. Cie de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 260 (2d Cir. 1963);
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 23 A.L.R. 1366 (D.C. Cit. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 852, (1950); Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480, 481 (1956);
Roseberry v. Starkovich, 387 P.2d 321, 322 (N.M. 1963); Hinnant v. Tide Water Power
Co., 187 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307, 37 A.L.R. 889 (1929). See generally BLcK, LAW
DinO,oARY 382 (4th ed. 1957).
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